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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE COALITION OF 
SENIOR CITIZENS, et al. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 20152 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants seek an award of attorneys1 fees for their 
participation in a case before the Public Service Commission 
of Utah based on Section 122 (a) of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 2632. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied 
Appellants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
NATURE OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
Respondent requests that the judgment below be 
affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as stated by Appellants are basically cor-
rect. However, the following additional comments regarding 
the background of the proceedings before the Public Service 
Commission and the participation of various parties in those 
proceedings are relevant. 
During 1977, the Public Service Commission initiated 
administrative rulemaking procedures to consider the 
adoption of the Utah Residential Utility Service Regulations 
("URUSR"). (Transcript before the Public Service Commission 
[hereafter Tr.] at 4-5). The Commission subsequently 
adopted the URUSR. (Tr. at 5). 
On November 9, 1978, Congress enacted PURPA. Section 
113 of PURPA required each state regulatory authority, not 
later than two years after the enactment of PURPA
 f to 
provide public notice and conduct a hearing to consider the 
adoption of various PURPA standards, including a standard 
for termination of service. 16 U.S.C. § 2623 (a) and 
(b) (4) . Section 113 also required each state regulatory 
authority to adopt, within the same two-year period, each 
PURPA standard or to state in writing the reasons why it 
declined to adopt each standard. 16 U.S.C. 2623(c). 
Section 116 of PURPA required each state regulatory 
authority to file with the Secretary of Energy, not later 
- ? -
than November 9, 1979, a report which summarized the 
determinations made and the actions taken with respect to 
each PURPA standard. 16 U.S.C. 2626(a). The Public 
Service Commission filed the required report and stated in 
that report that it felt its rules were in general compli-
ance with the standards, but that "further issues on the 
termination problem were being considered at a later date." 
(Tr. at 228-229) . 
Appellants filed their petition on November 26, 1979. 
The Public Service Commission set the petition for hearing 
and expanded the scope of the hearing to include consid-
eration of the PURPA standard for termination of service. 
(R. at 2, 11). During the hearings before the Commission, 
four electric utilities (including Respondent), two gas 
utilities, the Committee of Consumer Services and the 
Division of Public Utilities entered appearances through 
their respective counsel. (Tr. at 1, 2, 197). 
The Committee of Consumer Services was represented by 
Assistant Attorney General James Barker. Mr. Barker was 
present during the course of the hearings and he 
participated in those hearings; including raising objections 
to the introduction of testimony presented by utility 
witnesses (Tr. at 154, 357-359), assisting a public witness 
in presenting testimony (Tr. at 237) and engaging in cross 
examination of witnesses. (Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339). 
The Division of Public Utilities was represented by 
Assistant Attorney General Craig Rich. Mr. Rich was present 
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during the course of the hearings and he assisted the staff 
witnesses of the Division in presenting their testimony and 
exhibits to the Commission. (Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339; Index 
August 25 Tr.; Index August 13 Tr.). Mr. Rich also engaged 
in cross examination of witnesses. (Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339; 
Index August 25 Tr.; Index August 13 Tr.) 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERVENOR 
COMPENSATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF PURPA HAVE NOT BEEN MET, 
THEREBY PRECLUDING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Section 122 (a) of PURPA provides for intervenor compen-
sation only if each of several conditions is satisfied: 
First, "no alternative means" under § 122(b) must otherwise 
be available for assuring the representation of electric 
consumers; second, the electric consumer must have, by its 
participation, "substantially contributed" to the approval 
of a position advocated by it in a proceeding relating to 
the adoption of standards set forth in subtitle B of PURPA; 
and third, the electric consumer must demonstrate that it 
represents an interest which, absent an award of compen-
sation, would otherwise be unable to participate in the 
proceeding. In order to obtain compensation, an intervenor 
must show that all of these conditions have been satisfied. 
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1. THE STATE OF UTAH HAS PROVIDED "ALTERNATIVE MEANS" FOR 
ASSURING THE REPRESENTATION OF ELECTRIC CONSUMERS 
IN THE FORM OF THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
AND THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES AND 
THOSE AGENCIES "ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED" 
THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC, 
Since the State of Utah has provided "alternative 
means" to assure the representation of electric consumersf 
Appellants necessarily fail at the outset to satisfy all the 
conditions for intervenor compensation. Section 122 of 
PURPA reads as follows: 
Section 122. CONSUMER REPRESENTATION 
(a) COMPENSATION FOR COSTS OF 
PARTICIPATION OR INTERVENTION 
(1) I^_f no alternative means for assuring 
representation of electric consumers is adopted in 
accordance with subsection (b) and if an electric 
consumer of an electric utility substantially 
contributed to the approval, in whole or in part, 
of a position advocated by such consumer in a 
proceeding concerning such utility, and relating 
to any standard set forth in Subtitle B, such 
utility shall be liable to compensate such con-
sumer (pursuant to paragraph (2)) for reasonable 
attorneys1 fees, expert witness fees, and other 
reasonable costs incurred in preparation and 
advocacy of such position in such proceeding 
(including fees and costs of obtaining judicial 
review of any determination made in such proceed-
ing with respect to such position). 
(2) A consumer entitled to fees and costs 
under paragraph (1) may collect such fees and 
costs from an electric utility by bringing a civil 
action in any state court of competent juris-
diction, unless the state regulatory authority (in 
the case of a proceeding concerning a state 
regulated electric utility), . . .has adopted a 
reasonable procedure pursuant to which such 
authority or nonregulated electric utility — 
(A) determines the amount of such fees 
and costs, and 
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(B) includes an award of such fees and 
costs in its order in the 
proceeding. 
[(a)(3) omitted] 
(b) ALTERNATIVE MEANS. Compensation shall 
not be required under subsection (a) if the State, 
the State regulatory authority (in the case of a 
proceeding concerning a State regulated electric 
utility), . . . has provided an alternative means 
for providing adequate compensation to persons — 
(1) who have, or represent, an 
interest— 
(A) which would not otherwise be 
adequately represented in the 
proceeding, and 
(B) representation of which is 
necessary for a fair deter-
mination in the proceeding, 
and 
(2) who are, or represent an interest 
which is unable to effectively 
participate or intervene in the 
proceeding because such persons 
cannot afford to pay reasonable 
attorneys1 fees, expert witness 
fees, and other reasonable costs of 
preparing for, and participating or 
intervening in, such proceeding 
(including fees and costs of 
obtaining judicial review of such 
proceeding). 
[ (c) - (e) omitted] 
[Emphasis supplied]; 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a), (b). 
The legislative history of § 122 of PURPA makes clear 
that an "adequately funded office of public counsel" is one 
example of an alternative means of assuring representation 
of electric consumers: 
Section 122 is a modified version of the House 
provision with respect to consumer representa-
-
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tion. The purpose of this section is to provide 
a mechanism to assure that the interests of elec-
tric consumers will be represented at the state 
level in proceedings dealing with the standards 
set forth in subtitle B. The mechanism chosen 
for this purpose is either of two options One 
makes the utility liable to provide compensation 
directly to electric consumers who substantially 
contribute to the approval, in whole or in part, 
of a position advocated by the consumer in a 
proceeding concerning the utility relating to any 
standard set forth in this title by creating a 
right of action against the utility. The second 
option provides that the State or State 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility may 
have a program to otherwise provide adequate 
compensation to persons described in subsection 
(b) . Such a program may include an adequately 
funded office of public counsel which adequately 
represents the interests of persons described in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b). 
[Emphasis added] H.R. Rept. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess., 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, 7797, 7816 
[hereinafter Conference Report]. The persons described in 
"paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) [of Section 122]f" 
supra, are those who "would not otherwise be adequately 
represented in the proceeding," whose representation is 
"necessary for a fair determination," and who are otherwise 
"unable to effectively participate or intervene in the 
proceeding" because of their inability to pay the costs of 
participation. PURPA § 122(b)(1) and (2); 16 U.S.C. § 
2632(b)(1) and (2). These, among others, are the interests 
represented by the Division of Public Utilities and the 
Committee of Consumer Services. 
As part of its comprehensive statutory scheme for the 
regulation of public utilities, the legislature of the State 
of Utah has established the Division of Public Utilities and 
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the Committee of Consumer Services in order to provide two 
separate layers of consumer representation in public utility 
regulatory matters. The Division of Public Utilities is an 
agency within the Department of Business Regulation which 
has the statutory responsibility to represent the public 
interest in matters and proceedings involving public utility 
regulation. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l. The Division is 
empowered to initiate investigations, commence proceedings, 
file complaints, present evidence and recommendations and 
generally engage in all activities consistent with its 
statutory responsibility. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l. The 
Division also has the authority to hire the economists, 
accountants, engineers, inspectors, statisticians, lawyers, 
law clerks and other technical and professional experts it 
may require to perform its duties. Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4a-3. In addition, the State legislature has directed 
the Attorney General to appoint sufficient full-time legal 
counsel to assist, advise and represent the Division in the 
discharge of its duties. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-4. 
While the codification of the Division's duties and 
authority in Utah Code Annotated § 54-4a-l is relatively 
recent, this Court recognized in Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. P.S.C., 614 P2d 1242 (Utah 1980), that the 
1969 legislative reorganization of the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation transferred to the Division, under the 
direction and authority of its statutory administrator, 
those Public Service Commission functions which did not 
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directly involve the Commission's performance as an ad-
judicative or deliberative body. Thus, even prior to the 
enactment of § 54-4a-l, the Division had the authority to 
initiate investigations, file complaints, participate in 
hearings, appeal Commission orders and generally serve as an 
advocate to assert and protect the interests of the people 
of the State of Utah. Id. at 1252-1253; Utah code Ann. § 
54-4-2, 54-7-9, 54-7-12(2), 54-7-21, 54-7-24. 
Pursuant to its statutory responsibility to represent 
the interests of the people of the State of Utah, including 
Appellants' own constituency of low income and elderly 
consumers, the Division of Public Utilities appeared in the 
proceedings before the Public Service Commission. The 
Division presented evidence to the Commission on several 
topics including: the requirements of PURPA; the provisions 
of the PURPA termination of service standard; the provisions 
of the Department of Energy guidelines for consideration of 
the PURPA termination standard, (including the provisions 
dealing with the notice required before termination, third 
party notice and protection against termination where there 
is illness); the termination provisions of other states; and 
the areas in which the existing Utah Commission rules did 
not comply with the PURPA termination standard. (Tr. at 
201-224). Counsel for the Division also engaged in cross 
examination of witnesses and otherwise fully participated in 
the hearing process. In addition, the Division recommended 
that the Commission adopt the draft rules prepared by the 
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parties, including the provisions Appellants refer to on 
Page 14 of their Brief. (Tr. at 112). Thus, the Division 
not only fulfilled its responsibility to represent the 
public interest, including the interests of Appellants' own 
constituency, it also took a position similar to Appellants' 
position on the proposed rules. 
Notwithstanding, Appellants insist that the participa-
tion of the Division of Public Utilities in the proceedings 
did not constitute an "alternative means" for the represen-
tation of consumers because the Division "cannot represent 
consumer interests." (Brief of Appellants, p. 11). Since 
the Division has the statutory duty to represent the inter-
ests of consumers, and indeed represented consumer interests 
in the subject proceeding, Appellants are apparently arguing 
that the Division must represent only Appellants' own 
constituency in order to suffice as an "alternative means" 
of representation. 
Since an office of public counsel, as contemplated in 
the legislative history of PURPA, would necessarily have the 
mandate to represent all elements of the public who would 
not otherwise be heard, Appellants argument is incorrect. 
Indeed the Washington Supreme Court rejected that argument 
in Power v Washington Water Power Co., 662 P2d 374 (Wash. 
1983). (R. at 194-201). 
In that case, the Washington court rejected the argu-
ment that each segment of the public was entitled to sepa-
rate representation and held that a special assistant 
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attorney general appointed to represent the people of the 
State of Washington was an appropriate "alternative means" 
of representation within the requirements of PURPA. The 
Washington court also set out several criteria for the 
determination of what type of public counsel meets the PURPA 
requirements: 
To meet the requirements of PURPA, public 
counsel must be: (1) independent of the state's 
regulatory authority; (2) empowered to appear and 
participate in any regulatory or judicial 
proceeding; (3) authorized to retain outside 
experts and consultants in particular cases; and 
(4) authorized to hire and retain sufficient 
staff. . . . 
We point out, however, that the scope of this 
representation is subject to the limitation of 16 
U.S.C. § 2632(b)(1). The attorney general in 
providing alternative means is not required to 
represent the views of those consumers whose 
position is otherwise adequately represented. 
Accord, Re Costs of Participation in Elec. 
Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 259 
(Cal. P.U.C. 1980); Re Costs of Participation in 
Comm'n Proceedings on PURPA, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 
4th 280, 283, (Me. P.U.C. 1980). Furthermore, 
only that representation necessary for a "fair 
determination in the proceeding" (16 U.S.C.S 
2632(b)(1)(B) is required. Power, supra, at 378. 
Since the Division of Public Utilities has the re-
quisite independence and authority to meet the criteria 
established by the Washington Supreme Court, it is clear 
that the Division constitutes an "alternative means" for the 
representation of consumers under PURPA. However, the State 
legislature has also established the Committee of Consumer 
Services to provide another separate layer of representation 
for residential and small commercial consumers. 
The Committee of Consumer Services is a separate agency 
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within the Division of Public Utilities which has the 
specific responsibility to assist residential and small 
commercial consumers in appearing before the Public Service 
Commission and to serve as the "advocate on its own behalf 
and in its own name, of positions most advantageous to a 
majority of residential consumers as determined by the 
committee and those engaged in small commercial enterprises 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4 (1) , (2) and (3). The 
Committee consists of a six member policy-making board whose 
members must include one low income resident, one retired 
person, one small commercial consumer, one farmer or 
rancher, and one residential consumer. Utah Code Ann. § 
54-10-2. The directives of the Committee are carried out by 
the Committee staff, with the assistance of an attorney 
appointed by the Attorney General's office. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-10-5; § 54-10-7. 
The Committee of Consumer Services, like the Division 
of Public Utilities, has the statutory independence and 
authority to meet the requirements set out by the Washington 
Supreme Court for an "alternative means'1 of representation 
under PURPA. As an appointed citizen board with the power 
to establish its own policies and procedures, the Committee 
is independent of both the Public Service Commission and the 
Division of Public Utilities. Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-1 et 
seq. In addition, the Committee has the statutory authority 
to appear and participate in any regulatory or judicial 
proceeding and to hire experts and staff. Utah Code Ann. § 
- 12 -
54-10-4, 54-10-5, 54-10-7; (R. at 5, 10). Indeed, two 
members of the Committee staff were present during the 
hearings. (R. at 11). Thus, the State of Utah has provided 
two "alternative means" of representation for consumers. 
Despite the fact that the Committee has the statutory 
duty and authority to represent residential and small 
commercial consumers, including low income and elderly 
consumers, Appellants contend that the Committee cannot 
constitute an "alternative means" of consumer representation 
because the Committee is not authorized to award consumer 
compensation. (Brief of Appellant, p. 11). Appellants1 
contention is not supported by the provisions of PURPA or 
the language of the statute which established the Committee. 
The legislative history accompanying § 122 of PURPA 
makes clear that the purpose of § 122 is to "assure that the 
interests of electric consumers will be represented at the 
State level in proceedings dealing with the standards set 
forth in subtitle B." Conference Report, supra. In order 
to accomplish that purpose, PURPA § 122 provides that 
consumers must be reimbursed for their costs of participa-
tion in proceedings, unless the state has established an 
"alternative means" for assuring the representation of 
consumer interests. 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a). The PURPA § 122 
legislative history explicitly proffers, as one example of 
an alternative means for the representation of electric 
consumers, an "adequately funded office of public counsel 
which adequately represents "the interests of those electric 
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consumers." Conference Report, supra. There is no PURPA 
requirement that an office of public counsel, in order to 
constitute an alternative means of representation, must both 
represent consumers and pay consumers to represent 
themselves. Indeed, if such a requirement were to be read 
into PURPA, the people of the State of Utah would be 
required to pay for the same service at least three times; 
once to fund the Division of Public Utilities, once to fund 
the Committee of Consumer Services, and again to fund 
consumer participation. (See Part A 2 infra). 
Even if § 122 of PURPA could be interpreted to require 
intervenor compensation when an office of public counsel has 
already been established to provide an alternative means of 
representation, the State * legislature has authorized the 
Committee of Consumer Services to provide assistance to 
consumers who wish to participate in Public Service Commis-
sion proceedings. Indeed, the State legislature has 
mandated that the Committee "shall assist residential 
consumers and those engaged in small commercial enterprises 
in appearing before the public service commission of the 
state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4(2). Thus, the 
State of Utah has not only established two alternative means 
for assuring representation of consumers, it has also 
provided a means for assisting consumers to present their 
views to the Commission. 
Pursuant to its statutory responsibility to represent 
the interests of residential and small commercial consumers, 
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the Committee of Consumer Services appeared in the proceed-
ings before the Public Service Commission. The Committee 
was represented by Assistant Attorney General James Barker. 
Mr. Barker has been a member of the Utah Bar since 1954, and 
has served in a variety of official capacities in his 
professional life, including Salt Lake City Judge, Salt Lake 
City Commissioner, and Salt Lake City Attorney. (R. at 
170) . Mr. Barker has appeared before the Commission on 
numerous occasions. (R. at 170-171). It is Mr. Barker's 
opinion that he did a reasonable job advocating the inter-
ests of his client. (R. at 172). It is Mr. Barker's 
opinion that he was empowered to participate in the proceed-
ings, as well as appeals, and that there were no formal or 
informal restrictions on his representation of the 
Committee. (R. at 172). Mr. Barker's representation of the 
Committee was independent of the Public Service Commission 
and the Division of Public Utilities (R. at 172) . Mr. 
Barker, as attorney for the Committee, had the ability to 
present his own witnesses, if he thought it desirable, and 
he had adequate funding to hire expert witnesses in gas and 
electric cases. (R. at 167). 
Appellants, in their Brief, characterize the Commit-
tee's participation in the hearings before the Commission as 
passive. (Brief of Appellants, p. 12) . However, that is 
hardly a fair characterization of Mr. Barker's contribution 
to the proceedings. Mr. Barker fully participated in the 
hearing process and, in so doing, he served as a forceful 
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advocate through cross examination of positions similar to 
Appellants. (Tr. at 22-25, 67-72). In addition, Mr. Barker 
assisted a member of the board of the Utah State Coalition 
of Senior Citizens, an Appellant in this case, in presenting 
his statement to the Commission and raised objections to the 
testimony presented by utility witnesses. (Tr. at 237-238, 
154, 357-359). Thus, the Committee, like the Division, 
adequately represented the interests of consumers in the 
proceedings before the Public Service Commission* 
2. THE COSTS OF PARTICIPATION OF 
THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
AND THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES 
WERE UNDERWRITTEN BY RESPONDENT, 
AND ULTIMATELY ITS RATEPAYERS. 
As a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission, Respondent is required to pay a 
special fee which is determined each year by the Department 
of Business Regulation and the Public Service Commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-5-1.5. The purpose of this fee is to 
assure that Respondent and the other public utilities 
provide "all of the funds for the administration, support 
and maintenance of the public service commission and state 
agencies within the department of business regulation 
involved in the regulation of public utilities, including 
expenditures by the attorney general for utility regu-
lation...11. Utah Code Ann. § 54-5-1.5. Since this fee is 
ultimately shouldered by Respondent's ratepayers, the 
ratepayers pay the administrative and support costs of the 
- 16 -
Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer 
Services, including the costs of providing legal counsel for 
both agencies and the costs of hiring the consultants and 
witnesses either agency may decide to employ. 
Appellants cite the decision of the California Public 
Utilities Commission in Re Costs of Participation in 
Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 P.U.R. 4th 259 (1980)f as support 
for the proposition that neither the Division of Public 
Utilities, nor the Committee of Consumer Services can 
provide an "alternative means" for public representation 
within the meaning of PURPA. (Brief of Appellants, p. 
10-11). In so doing, Appellants cull language in the 
decision that "(a)ny staff would be hard pressed to repre-
sent all of these interests adequately." (Brief of Appel-
lants, p. 10). Appellants fail, however, to mention the 
further pronouncement of the California Commission in the 
same decision relating to the prerequisites for intervenor 
funding: 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid burdensome ex-
actions upon the public, we conclude that a 
consumer is not eligible for compensation for 
presenting the same evidence on the same issues as 
the staff. In order to be eligible for compen-
sation, a consumer must raise a different issue, 
present or elicit new or different evidence, or 
take a different position from that of the staff. 
. . . Above all, the citizens of the state should 
not be required to pay twice for the same ser-
vices, once as taxpayers (to fund the staff's 
participation), and again as ratepayers (to fund a 
consumer's participation). 
(Emphasis supplied) 37 P.U.R. 4th at 265-266. 
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The Maine Public Utilities Commission in Costs of 
Participation in Commission Proceedings on PURPA, 37 P.U.R. 
4th 280 (Me. P.U.C. 1980), also expressed concern about the 
expenditure of ratepayer monies and adopted procedures to 
prevent ratepayers from being charged twice for the costs of 
public representation. The Maine Commission stated: 
No consumer shall be entitled to an award of 
compensation for advocating any position in a 
commission proceeding relating to a PURPA issue if 
the commission determines that position is the 
same or similar to the position advocated in the 
proceeding by any agency or organization funded in 
whole or in part by state or federal money. 
Id. at 283. 
The prospect of ratepayers paying twice for public 
representation, a prospect only alluded to by the California 
and Maine Commissions, becomes very real in the context of 
the proceedings before the Public Service Commission in case 
no. 79-999-02. Indeed, as noted previously, Respondent, and 
hence its ratepayers, is already underwriting, through its 
funding of the Division of Public Utilities and the Commit-
tee of Consumer Services, the costs of public participation 
in those Commission proceedings. If intervenor reimburse-
ment of Appellants' attorney fees is ordered, Respondent's 
ratepayers will be required, for yet a third time, to pay 
for the costs of public participation. In addition, to the 
extent Appellants or their counsel receive federal or state 
funding, Respondent's ratepayers face the prospect of paying 
twice for Appellants' costs of participation; once as 
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ratepayers, if intervenor compensation is ordered, and once 
as taxpayers. 
Not only do Respondent's ratepayers face the prospect 
of repeatedly paying the costs of public participation in 
the subject Commission proceedings, they also face the 
prospect, if reimbursement of Appellants1 attorneys fees is 
ordered, of paying that portion of Appellants1 costs which 
should be borne by other state utilities. During the 
proceedings before the Commission, Empire Electric Asso-
ciation, C. P. National and Moon Lake Electric Association 
entered appearances through their respective counsel. The 
Report and Interim Order of the Commission specifically 
provided that the modifications to the Commission's rules 
applied to both Moon Lake Electric and C. P. National. (R. 
at 75). Despite these facts, Appellants seek to impose the 
entire cost of their participation on the ratepayers of 
Respondent. 
In summary, "alternative means," in the form of the 
Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer 
Services, were provided for "assuring representation of 
electric consumers," as contemplated by § 122(a) of PURPA. 
The Division and the Committee adequately represented the 
interests of electric consumers in the subject proceeding, 
including the interests of Appellants' own constituency — 
were that not the case, Respondent submits that it was 
wrongfully assessed the regulatory fees which underwrote the 
costs for those agencies to appear and represent the public. 
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Accordingly, Respondent should not be required, yet again, 
to underwrite the costs of public participation in the 
proceedings before the Commission. In addition, there is no 
provision of PURPA or any other statutory or equitable 
consideration which would require Respondent and its 
ratepayers to pay the entire cost of Appellants' participa-
tion, as Appellants would have them do, when there were 
three other state electric utilities involved in and con-
cerned with the subject proceedings. 
B. APPELLANTS' FAILED TO APPEAL THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER 
DENYING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS" FEES 
AND APPELLANTS' NOW SEEK TO COLLATERALLY 
ATTACK THAT COMMISSION ORDER. 
On May 25, 1982, Appellants filed a motion with the 
Public Service Commission requesting an award of attorney 
fees for their participation in the proceedings before the 
Commission, On July 13, 1982, the Commission issued an 
order denying Appellants' request. The Commission stated: 
Mr. Plenk's Motion was not filed until 20 months 
after the proceedings were closed for purposes of 
offering evidence and presenting arguments. The 
Motion was not submitted in a timely manner, 
making it impossible for the Commission to estab-
lish procedures for evaluating the merits of his 
claim or for determining the amount of such fees 
and making it impossible for the Commission to 
include an award of attorneys1 fees in the Orders 
entered in these proceedings. Accordingly, the 
Motion for Attorneys1 Fees should be denied. 
The appropriate forum for consideration of the correct-
ness of this order is the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code 
Annotated § 54-7-16 provides: 
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. , . No court of this state (except the Supreme 
Court to the extent herein specified) shall have 
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul 
any order or decision of the commission, or to 
suspend ox delay the execution or operation 
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with 
the commission in the performance of its official 
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall 
be from the Supreme Court to the commission in all 
proper cases. 
Thus, since Appellants ' chose the Pub] i c Service Commission 
a e f- :: i urn i i 1 i ; 1 :i :ii • ::::]l: i tc j: i 11: si le tl: lei i: c -Il a :i m c if a ,,,t tor i ley s f 
fees, the Appellants" relief from, the Commission's order I s 
solely through an appea] to this Court Appe 11 ants fai 1 ed 
to appea ] the Commissi oi i ! s • : J : der ai i :I I: .1 iej si lould be pi: ecJ i idee 
from, collaterally attacking that order North Salt Lake v 
St, Joseph. Water & Irr. Co., 223 P. 2d 577 (01: , ] 95 0) 
Appel lants argue that: a. c:i v i 1 act :il oi I i s appropriate i n 
this case because the Pub 1 i c Se rvi ce Commi s s ion. doe s not 
make direct awards... (Brief of Appe.,1 lants ,- j: • 6-7) However, 
thei e i s i v :: pi: oi louncemei it 1: ;r tl le I i ib„3 i c Service C Dinmissd on 
that it wi 11 not make direct awards in an appropriate case, 
Indeed, the order from,, the Commi s si on j n the sub j ect pro-
c e e d i i i g in e i: e ] y i e K e a 3 s 11: :t a 1: A p p e 2 3 a i l I: s ! £ a 1 3 u r € !:  • :: • 1: :i in, e J y 
file their request denied the Commission, an adequate oppor-
tuni ty to exerc i se i t s s t a t e and PURPA s t a, tutory re spon-
sibili 1: .ies tc pi: o tec I: tl le ra tepay ei: s f r om wa .stefu] c J: id 
unnecessary expenditures of their monies and to assure that 
the interests of consumers are adequately represented, 
Evei i a • ::::i:i,,:i:: sor } i e i i e% :: f tl i„e i e cox d i i: :t„ the proceedings 
before the Commission makes the reasons for the Commission's 
denial of attorneys 1 fees apparent. The proceedings were 
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initiated by Appellants1 petition for a moratorium on winter 
termination of utility service and for rulemaking to estab-
lish rules regarding winter termination of utility service. 
The Commission expanded the scope of the proceedings to 
include the consideration of the PURPA standard for termina-
tion of service. (R. at 11) . The Commission was required 
by PURPA to consider that standard and had already reported 
to the Department of Energy that the PURPA termination 
standard would be considered. 16 U.S.C. § 2623 (a), (b)(4); 
(Tr. at 228-229); (R. at 73). 
Following three days of public hearings, the Commission 
denied Appellants' motion and issued an Interim Order which 
directed the parties to meet in committee and draft a set of 
proposed regulations for Commission review. (R. at 108). 
Subsequently, two days of public hearings were held to 
consider the draft regulations. (Tr. at 108). During the 
hearings before the Commission, four electric utilities, two 
gas utilities, the Committee of Consumer Services and the 
Division of Public Utilities entered appearances. (Tr. at 
1, 2, 197). In addition, various public witnesses presented 
testimony to the Commission. (Tr. at 237, 241, 247, 302). 
Out of this process, a process which lasted some ten months, 
came several revisions to the Commission's rules on termina-
tion of service. 
It is hardly surprising that, some twenty months after 
the close of the proceedings, the Commission found it 
impossible to prepare procedures and retroactively determine 
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whether Appellant? had mac?-" ~ contribution to the Com 
mission 1? decisir-r.. Howev-: , Appel l a n t now seek. >-i ~>e fi ve 
y- . - • •"* • -c JKJIJ, I o:i i 3 i i 
another f^rur- ..act . despi it "heir failure to timely request 
aiicrneys ' fees, t r.*->\ a* t ^v*- i r Led to i ntervenor reimburse-
ir - - e e 1 :: I: • :: i e c o v e r t h e i r e n t i r e 
ccs', i,: w^i ijcipaticn :.un R^spondei it, a 1 though several 
electric utilities appeared ir. and were concerned with the 
pr ---: 
I1 * ..id be inappropriate to al 1 ow Appellants tc r rw 
collateral -^  <rta^i *;r.<=- ,•!; .ssion's d w . ^ n - tha*- • -e 
a * . nsuffi ci ei i - e 
CommissxL.'i iu :nne.\ act. 
CONCLUSION 
rriKn c o u r t below was correct in deciding that Appella-' 
are net entitled to an award of attorne-yc J fees. 1* 
r e s p e c t f u 1 1 "," I.,I i "VJ :! ' I"1 "it I li i '"« *.'< MIL I a I L i i HI it I!: 1 le dec . r . 
the court below, awarding summary- judgment i :i:i favor 
Respondent. 
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DATED this 21st day of November, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT GORDON 
EDWARD HUNTER 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
P. 0. Box 899 
1407 West North Temple 
Suite 339 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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